Title :
Research on Invite Bid Models of Public Projects Invested by Government Based on Principal-Agent Theory
Author :
Lin-xiu, Wang ; Xie-lei
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., China Univ. of Min. & Technol., Xuzhou
Abstract :
In accordance with the public projects invested by government based on principal-agent under asymmetric information, analyzing the issue of choosing the authorized company, an operable model on invite-bidding was built by making use of the Deuel illegal, analytical hierarchy process and mathematics synthetic judgment method. Through the analysis of model extremes, It can provide some decided references for the client (the government) in deciding project consultation company.
Keywords :
investment; public administration; analytical hierarchy process; asymmetric information; government investment; invite bid models; mathematics synthetic judgment method; principal-agent theory; project consultation company; public projects; Civil engineering; Electronic mail; Environmental economics; Financial management; Government; Information analysis; Information management; Innovation management; Investments; Project management; Government Investment; Mathematics synthetic Judgment Method; Project Principle-agent;
Conference_Titel :
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering, 2008. ICIII '08. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Taipei
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3435-0
DOI :
10.1109/ICIII.2008.266
