A numerical analysis of the evolutionary iterated snowdrift game

Author

Greenwood, Garrison W. ; Chopra, Shubham

Author_Institution

Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Portland State Univ., Portland, OR, USA

fYear

2011

fDate

5-8 June 2011

Firstpage

2010

Lastpage

2016

Abstract

The iterated prisoner´s dilemma (IPD) game has been extensively investigated to help researchers gain a better understanding of how cooperation develops in populations. One criticism of IPD is it underestimates the level of cooperation particularly in human populations. The iterated snowdrift (ISD) game has emerged as a viable alternative model, in part because it predicts higher cooperation levels. To date no numerical analysis of ISD has been done. In this paper we report the results from a numerical analysis conducted on an ISD with an N-player, well-mixed population. Our results show, with certain cost-to benefit ratios, evolved ISD strategies can maintain surprisingly high quasi-stable levels of cooperation in the population.

Keywords

evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; N-player; cost-to benefit ratios; evolutionary iterated snowdrift game; human populations; iterated prisoner dilemma game; numerical analysis; viable alternative model; Cloning; Driver circuits; Games; History; Numerical analysis; Snow; Time series analysis;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Evolutionary Computation (CEC), 2011 IEEE Congress on

Conference_Location

New Orleans, LA

ISSN

Pending

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-7834-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CEC.2011.5949862

Filename

5949862