DocumentCode
2227017
Title
Research on Small and Medium Enterprises Trade Credit Financing Based on Evolutionary Game
Author
Zhang, Lang ; Hu, Haiqing ; Zhang, Daohong ; Chen, Liang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Xi´´an Univ. of Technol., Xi´´an, China
Volume
3
fYear
2010
fDate
26-28 Nov. 2010
Firstpage
472
Lastpage
476
Abstract
On the condition that it is difficult for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to finance from specialized financial institutions such as banks, trade credit has become an important financing channel for SMEs. Based on evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics equation, this paper studies the evolutionary game process of strategy choosing for bounded rational credit providers and SMEs in the process of trade credit financing. The results indicate that there are several factors which have significant effects on the development of SMEs trade credit financing, including the credit provider´s extra profit arisen from implementing the strategy of increasing credit, the trade credit financing costs of SMEs, as well as the transmission speed and range of default information.
Keywords
credit transactions; evolutionary computation; financial management; game theory; small-to-medium enterprises; bounded rational credit provider; evolutionary game theory; financial institution; financing channel; replicator dynamics equation; small and medium enterprise; trade credit financing; transmission speed; Evolutionary Game Theory; Replicator Dynamics Equation; SMEs; Trade Credit Financing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Kunming
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8829-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICIII.2010.434
Filename
5694779
Link To Document