DocumentCode :
2232012
Title :
Could Asymmetric Regulation of Access Charges Improve the Competition between Mobile Networks?
Author :
Cricelli, Livio ; Pillo, Francesca Di ; Gastaldi, Massimo ; Levialdi, Nathan
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Cassino, Cassino
fYear :
2007
fDate :
14-15 June 2007
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
8
Abstract :
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumptions of discriminatory retail pricing and non reciprocal access charges. In the two way interconnection, the networks revenue depends on two factors: the retail price and the access charge. If the retail prices are different between calls that terminate on the same network (on net) and calls that terminate on the rival network (off net), the competition is more complex, involving positive networks externalities for the incumbent operator.
Keywords :
mobile radio; pricing; asymmetric regulation; discriminatory retail pricing; interconnected mobile phone network; nonreciprocal access charge; positive network; Communication industry; Costs; Environmental management; Instruments; LAN interconnection; Mobile communication; Mobile handsets; Pricing; Regulators; Brand loyalty; discriminatory retail prices; interconnected asymmetric networks; non reciprocal access charges;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Telecommunication Techno-Economics, 2007. CTTE 2007. 6th Conference on
Conference_Location :
Helsinki
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1233-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-1233-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CTTE.2007.4389899
Filename :
4389899
Link To Document :
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