DocumentCode
2238536
Title
Games of Incomplete Information to Logistics Outsourcing
Author
Cao Qingkui ; Zhang Xianxin
Author_Institution
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Hebei Univ. of Eng., Handan
Volume
2
fYear
2008
fDate
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage
277
Lastpage
280
Abstract
This paper take the background of outsourcing of logistics services, through analyzed the game model of couple under the situation of incomplete information, attempts to set up a game model of incomplete information of the logistics out-souring enterprises and logistics service provider in outsourcing of logistics services, finally, put forward an important conclusion, in the early stages of cooperation, logistics out-souring enterprise pay great attention to supervise, and logistics service provider will not take strategy of violation. However, with the deepening of cooperation, the two sides will understand each other gradually. Trust factor will occupy the dominant position of cooperation. Logistics out-souring enterprise will reduce its power of supervision gradually and logistics service provider will take the strategy of violation because of the trust from the other party. It looks like a paradox, but it reflects a main factor of moral hazard in the logistics outsourcing business - trust. It has a high practical value to the logistics outsourcing business.
Keywords
business data processing; game theory; logistics; outsourcing; game model; incomplete information; logistics outsouring enterprise; trust factor; Costs; Educational institutions; Engineering management; Ethics; Forward contracts; Hazards; Logistics; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Seminars; Game of couple; Games of incomplete information; Logistics outsourcing; Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies; moral hazard;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.37
Filename
5116474
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