• DocumentCode
    2238536
  • Title

    Games of Incomplete Information to Logistics Outsourcing

  • Author

    Cao Qingkui ; Zhang Xianxin

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Hebei Univ. of Eng., Handan
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    19-19 Dec. 2008
  • Firstpage
    277
  • Lastpage
    280
  • Abstract
    This paper take the background of outsourcing of logistics services, through analyzed the game model of couple under the situation of incomplete information, attempts to set up a game model of incomplete information of the logistics out-souring enterprises and logistics service provider in outsourcing of logistics services, finally, put forward an important conclusion, in the early stages of cooperation, logistics out-souring enterprise pay great attention to supervise, and logistics service provider will not take strategy of violation. However, with the deepening of cooperation, the two sides will understand each other gradually. Trust factor will occupy the dominant position of cooperation. Logistics out-souring enterprise will reduce its power of supervision gradually and logistics service provider will take the strategy of violation because of the trust from the other party. It looks like a paradox, but it reflects a main factor of moral hazard in the logistics outsourcing business - trust. It has a high practical value to the logistics outsourcing business.
  • Keywords
    business data processing; game theory; logistics; outsourcing; game model; incomplete information; logistics outsouring enterprise; trust factor; Costs; Educational institutions; Engineering management; Ethics; Forward contracts; Hazards; Logistics; Nash equilibrium; Outsourcing; Seminars; Game of couple; Games of incomplete information; Logistics outsourcing; Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies; moral hazard;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3560-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISBIM.2008.37
  • Filename
    5116474