DocumentCode
2238652
Title
Signaling Game Analysis on Phenomena of Counterfeit Commodity
Author
Lu, Fangyuan ; Qiu, Bingxian
Author_Institution
Bus. Sch., Zhengzhou Univ., Zhengzhou
Volume
2
fYear
2008
fDate
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage
308
Lastpage
311
Abstract
Analyzing selecting action of strategy in interaction between the supplier and the purchasers in market with the signaling game theory. Using refining Bayesian balance of signaling Game: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, comparing the benefit of genuine and counterfeit commodity, the camouflage cost of counterfeit commodity which is too small is the important factor of counterfeit commodity in flood. The result shows that if the information between suppliers and purchasers is unable to be transferred effectively, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; Establishing and improving management system in market, increasing the protective efforts to enterprises which produce the genuine, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.
Keywords
Bayes methods; business data processing; game theory; purchasing; Bayesian balance; counterfeit commodity; management system; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium; signaling game theory; Bayesian methods; Cost benefit analysis; Counterfeiting; Environmental economics; Game theory; Information analysis; Information management; Macroeconomics; Seminars; Signal analysis; counterfeit commodity; pooling equilibrium; refining Bayesian balance; separating equilibrium; signaling game;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.148
Filename
5116481
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