DocumentCode :
2238652
Title :
Signaling Game Analysis on Phenomena of Counterfeit Commodity
Author :
Lu, Fangyuan ; Qiu, Bingxian
Author_Institution :
Bus. Sch., Zhengzhou Univ., Zhengzhou
Volume :
2
fYear :
2008
fDate :
19-19 Dec. 2008
Firstpage :
308
Lastpage :
311
Abstract :
Analyzing selecting action of strategy in interaction between the supplier and the purchasers in market with the signaling game theory. Using refining Bayesian balance of signaling Game: separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, comparing the benefit of genuine and counterfeit commodity, the camouflage cost of counterfeit commodity which is too small is the important factor of counterfeit commodity in flood. The result shows that if the information between suppliers and purchasers is unable to be transferred effectively, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; Establishing and improving management system in market, increasing the protective efforts to enterprises which produce the genuine, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.
Keywords :
Bayes methods; business data processing; game theory; purchasing; Bayesian balance; counterfeit commodity; management system; pooling equilibrium; separating equilibrium; signaling game theory; Bayesian methods; Cost benefit analysis; Counterfeiting; Environmental economics; Game theory; Information analysis; Information management; Macroeconomics; Seminars; Signal analysis; counterfeit commodity; pooling equilibrium; refining Bayesian balance; separating equilibrium; signaling game;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Business and Information Management, 2008. ISBIM '08. International Seminar on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3560-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISBIM.2008.148
Filename :
5116481
Link To Document :
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