DocumentCode
2241655
Title
A study on manager incentive effect based on principal-agent relationship
Author
Yu-fang, Shang
Author_Institution
Coll. of Econ. & Law, Bohai Univ., Jinzhou, China
fYear
2011
fDate
13-15 Sept. 2011
Firstpage
587
Lastpage
592
Abstract
Based on existing researches on incentive measures of listed companies, this paper explains the significance of incentive plans for China´s listed companies and demonstrates the incentive compensation model as a mature and widely used measure in China to create corporate value. In the empirical analysis, it´s found that the proportion of managerial ownership in China is low, indicating that the equity incentive isn´t the first choice for listed companies in China. The results of this analysis provide main reference for listed companies in future with equity incentive plans.
Keywords
incentive schemes; personnel; strategic planning; China listed companies; corporate value; equity incentive planning; incentive compensation model; manager incentive effects; managerial ownership; principal agent relationship; Companies; Correlation; Ethics; Hazards; Industries; Mathematical model; Profitability; agency costs; equity incentive; listed company; managerial ownership; principal-agent;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Rome
ISSN
2155-1847
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-1885-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSE.2011.6070022
Filename
6070022
Link To Document