• DocumentCode
    2241655
  • Title

    A study on manager incentive effect based on principal-agent relationship

  • Author

    Yu-fang, Shang

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ. & Law, Bohai Univ., Jinzhou, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    13-15 Sept. 2011
  • Firstpage
    587
  • Lastpage
    592
  • Abstract
    Based on existing researches on incentive measures of listed companies, this paper explains the significance of incentive plans for China´s listed companies and demonstrates the incentive compensation model as a mature and widely used measure in China to create corporate value. In the empirical analysis, it´s found that the proportion of managerial ownership in China is low, indicating that the equity incentive isn´t the first choice for listed companies in China. The results of this analysis provide main reference for listed companies in future with equity incentive plans.
  • Keywords
    incentive schemes; personnel; strategic planning; China listed companies; corporate value; equity incentive planning; incentive compensation model; manager incentive effects; managerial ownership; principal agent relationship; Companies; Correlation; Ethics; Hazards; Industries; Mathematical model; Profitability; agency costs; equity incentive; listed company; managerial ownership; principal-agent;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Rome
  • ISSN
    2155-1847
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-1885-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2011.6070022
  • Filename
    6070022