DocumentCode :
2242812
Title :
An Optimization Problem on Two-Partition of Jobs for Profit Allocation
Author :
Chen, Quanle ; Cai, Xiaoqiang ; Gu, Yanhong
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Syst. Eng. & Eng. Manage., Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong
fYear :
2006
fDate :
4-7 Dec. 2006
Firstpage :
626
Lastpage :
629
Abstract :
This paper addresses a discrete optimization problem involving a new game situation, where after two manufacturers have jointly contracted with a customer for processing n non-preemptive jobs owing to their insufficient operation facilities, they need to bargain on a two-partition of these jobs to obtain a profit distribution reasonable and acceptable for each manufacturer. The profit in processing the jobs assigned to each manufacturer in one partition is related with an optimal schedule for minimizing a common cost function on job schedules. This discrete game situation is an extension of the original Nash bargaining model (NBM) which is formulated to a continuous optimization problem. In this paper the continuous optimization problem, whose solution is the famous Nash bargaining solution (NBS), is revised in order to design a valid solution scheme for profit allocation of our situation. A novel dynamic programming algorithm for this extended problem is developed for a type of special cases
Keywords :
game theory; job shop scheduling; optimisation; Nash bargaining model; Nash bargaining solution; customer; dynamic programming algorithm; game situation; jobs two-partition; manufacturers; nonpreemptive jobs; optimization problem; profit allocation; profit distribution; Cost function; Game theory; Job shop scheduling; Manufacturing processes; Mathematics; NIST; Optimal scheduling; Pulp manufacturing; Research and development management; Systems engineering and theory;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Circuits and Systems, 2006. APCCAS 2006. IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on
Conference_Location :
Singapore
Print_ISBN :
1-4244-0387-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/APCCAS.2006.342066
Filename :
4145471
Link To Document :
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