Title :
An Equilibrium-Based Approach for Determining Winners in Combinatorial Auctions
Author :
Tsung, ChenKun ; Ho, HannJang ; Lee, SingLing
Author_Institution :
Comput. Sci. & Inf. Eng., Nat. Chung Cheng Univ., Chiayi, Taiwan
Abstract :
Determining winners in combinatorial auctions is an NP-complete problem. Based on the idea of searching Nash Equilibria (NE), this paper presents a local search procedure to determine winners. To improve the solution quality calculated by the local search, we propose Nash Equilibrium Search Approach (NESA) to probe various NE solutions. According to the simulation results, auctioneer´s revenue in NESA is at least 1.08% and 9.10% more than that in a general GA and Casanova, respectively. A stable solution based on NESA will be obtained within 400 seconds. Moreover, simulation results show that the solution quality of NESA is near-optimal.
Keywords :
combinatorial mathematics; commerce; game theory; optimisation; search problems; NESA; NP-complete problem; Nash equilibrium search approach; combinatorial auction; equilibrium-based approach; local search procedure; winner determination problem; Approximation algorithms; Computational modeling; Convergence; Economic indicators; Nash equilibrium; Optimized production technology; Simulation; NP-complete problem; Nash Equilibrium; combinatorial auction; local search procedure; winner determination problem;
Conference_Titel :
Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications (ISPA), 2011 IEEE 9th International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Busan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0391-1
Electronic_ISBN :
978-0-7695-4428-1
DOI :
10.1109/ISPA.2011.13