Title :
A non-cooperative power control game in delay-constrained multiple-access networks
Author :
Meshkati, Farhad ; Poor, H. Vincent ; Schwartz, Stuart C.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng., Princeton Univ., NJ
Abstract :
A game-theoretic approach for studying power control in multiple-access networks with transmission delay constraints is proposed. A non-cooperative power control game is considered in which each user seeks to choose a transmit power that maximizes its own utility while satisfying the user´s delay requirements. The utility function measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy and the user´s delay constraint is modeled as an upper bound on the delay outage probability. The Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived, and its existence and uniqueness are proved. Using a large-system analysis, explicit expressions for the utilities achieved at equilibrium are obtained for the matched filter, decorrelating and (linear) minimum mean square error multiuser detectors. The effects of delay constraints on the users´ utilities (in bits/Joule) and network capacity (i.e., the maximum number of users that can be supported) are quantified
Keywords :
delays; game theory; least mean squares methods; multi-access systems; power control; radio networks; telecommunication control; Nash equilibrium; delay outage probability; delay-constrained multiple-access networks; game-theoretic approach; large-system analysis; matched filter; minimum mean square error multiuser detectors; noncooperative power control game; transmission delay constraints; utility function; Delay effects; Disruption tolerant networking; Energy efficiency; Energy measurement; Intelligent networks; Nash equilibrium; Power control; Quality of service; Resource management; Throughput;
Conference_Titel :
Information Theory, 2005. ISIT 2005. Proceedings. International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Adelaide, SA
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9151-9
DOI :
10.1109/ISIT.2005.1523426