• DocumentCode
    2286288
  • Title

    Complex dynamics analysis for a Bertrand duopoly model with bounded rationality

  • Author

    Zhang, Ji-Xiang ; Zhou, De-qun ; Wang, Yan-Hua

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Nanjing Univ. of Aeronaut. & Astronaut., Nanjing, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    14-16 Sept. 2009
  • Firstpage
    190
  • Lastpage
    195
  • Abstract
    A dynamic of Bertrand duopoly game is analyzed, where players use different production methods and choose their prices with bounded rationality. The equilibriums of the corresponding discrete dynamical systems are investigated. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability of Nash equilibrium, as some parameters of the model are varied, gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos. On this basis, we discover that an increase of adjustment speed of bounded rational player can make Bertrand market sink into the chaotic state. Finally, the complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by numerical simulation.
  • Keywords
    bifurcation; chaos; decision theory; discrete systems; game theory; numerical stability; oligopoly; pricing; Bertrand duopoly game model; Nash equilibrium; bifurcation; bounded rationality; chaos; complex dynamics analysis; discrete dynamical system; higher order cycle; local adjustment process; pricing; production method; stability condition; Aerodynamics; Chaos; Conference management; Costs; Educational institutions; Energy management; Engineering management; Nash equilibrium; Production; Stability; Bertrand duopoly model; Nash equilibrium; discrete dynamical system; heterogeneous expectations; stability;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2009. ICMSE 2009. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Moscow
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3970-6
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3971-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5317513
  • Filename
    5317513