Title :
A game analysis on reputation governance mechanism of trade behaviors in industrial cluster
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Univ. of Shanghai for Sci. & Technol., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
The industrial cluster shows its particular competition advantages, so the world forming many clusters under the globalization. Competition and cooperation will enhance the enterprises´ competition in cluster. Due to all kinds of reasons, the members in industrial cluster may produce opportunism behavior to seize the behalf of the trade companion. So we can see some enterprise contracted based on common demands. In bargaining process, because some members over-consider of self-profits and be afraid of others´ opportunism action, they will deviate to contracts, which will result in un-stability and failure. Reputation governance mechanism can save trade cost, promote cooperation. By modified the KMRW model, the paper draws the conclusion that under the network of cluster, reputation governance mechanism is important in industrial cluster to governance the opportunism behavior. That is the members should pay much attention to keep good reputation. Reputation governance mechanism is one of the important governance mechanism of industrial cluster.
Keywords :
game theory; industrial economics; bargaining process; game analysis; industrial cluster; opportunism behavior; reputation governance mechanism; trade behaviors; Conference management; Contracts; Costs; Engineering management; Finance; Game theory; Globalization; Information theory; Technology management; Toy industry; game; governance; industrial cluster; reputation; trade behavior;
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Engineering, 2009. ICMSE 2009. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Moscow
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-3970-6
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-3971-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSE.2009.5317841