• DocumentCode
    2311316
  • Title

    Mitigating Evil Twin Attacks in 802.11

  • Author

    Bauer, Kevin ; Gonzales, Harold ; McCoy, Damon

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, CO
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    7-9 Dec. 2008
  • Firstpage
    513
  • Lastpage
    516
  • Abstract
    Due to the prevalence of insecure open 802.11 access points, it is currently easy for a malicious party to launch a variety of attacks such as eavesdropping and data injection. In this paper, we consider a particular threat called the evil twin attack, which occurs when an adversary clones an open access point and exploits common automatic access point selection techniques to trick a wireless client into associating with the malicious access point. We propose two lines of defense against this attack. First, we present an evil twin detection strategy called context-leashing based upon recording the nearby access points when first associating with an access point. Using this contextual information, the client determines if an adversary has setup an evil twin access point at a different location. Next, we propose an SSH-style authentication method called EAP-SWAT to perform one-way access point authentication that fits into the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) framework.
  • Keywords
    message authentication; protocols; radio access networks; telecommunication security; wireless LAN; SSH-style authentication method; automatic access point selection technique; context-leashing; evil twin attack mitigation; extensible authentication protocol; malicious access point; one-way access point authentication; wireless 802.11 access point; Access protocols; Authentication; Cloning; Communication system security; Computer crime; Computer science; Network servers; Operating systems; Probes; Wireless networks;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Performance, Computing and Communications Conference, 2008. IPCCC 2008. IEEE International
  • Conference_Location
    Austin, Texas
  • ISSN
    1097-2641
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3368-1
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1097-2641
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PCCC.2008.4745081
  • Filename
    4745081