DocumentCode :
2321116
Title :
Study on the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise based on the reputation effect
Author :
Gongxiang, Li ; Yilin, Yin
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Manage., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
Volume :
3
fYear :
2010
fDate :
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage :
1770
Lastpage :
1773
Abstract :
For the government investment project, there is a long-term cooperation between the government principal and the agent enterprise. The incentive model of reputation effect of the agent enterprise was built to solve the long-term reward incentive of the agent enterprise under long-term game. The effort degree of the agent enterprise was analyzed with the influence of the reputation effect, and incentive methods of government principal were discussed based on the reputation effect under the cases of symmetry and asymmetric information. The results show that the reputation effect is conducive to encourage the agent enterprise to work harder and the government principal could achieve the long-term incentive effect by adjusting the incentive structure and increasing the reputation incentive.
Keywords :
game theory; incentive schemes; investment; project management; public finance; agent enterprise; asymmetric information; government investment project; government principal; incentive structure; long-term game; long-term reward incentive; reputation effect; reputation incentive; Contracts; Councils; Ethics; Government; Hazards; Information analysis; Investments; Project management; Stability; Technology management; Agent Construction System; Government Investment Project; Project Management; Reputation Effect; Reward Incentive;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461305
Filename :
5461305
Link To Document :
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