A pricing-based cooperation bandwidth allocations algorithm using non-cooperative game theory

In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus, spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. A pricing-based cooperation bandwidth allocations (CBAs) algorithm using non-cooperative game is proposed to stimulate the selfish node to cooperate. Firstly, we theoretically analyze the feasible region of charge price and reimbursement price by using geometrical interpretation. Furthermore, we discuss the Nash equilibrium of CBAs under different cases. Meanwhile, the amount of bandwidth that source node forwards data through relay node, and the amount of bandwidth that relay node helps source node to relay data are obtained. Finally, we propose an algorithm by using non-cooperative game theory to realize the pricing-based CBAs. Simulation results show that, compared with no pricing-based incentive, the proposed algorithm can improve source node´s energy efficiency measured by bit per Joule, and increase the revenue of relay node.