Title :
Contract Design of Reverse Supply Chain under uncertainty for the quality of the waste materials
Author :
Xiong Weiqing ; Wei Ping ; Wu Xiaoxi
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Bus., Ningbo Univ., Ningbo, China
Abstract :
Contracts are designed under uncertainty for the quality of the waste materials. Design separating equilibrium model pooling equilibrium model and quasi-separating equilibrium model under incomplete information. Manufacturer is unable to distinguish recycler and should improve the cost of “lie” in pooling equilibrium in pooling equilibrium.
Keywords :
contracts; industrial waste; recycling; supply chain management; contract design; pooling equilibrium model; quasiseparating equilibrium model; recycler; reverse supply chain; separating equilibrium model; uncertainty; waste material quality; Contracts; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Supply chains; Uncertainty; Waste materials; Contract Design; Information Asymmetry; Reverse Supply Chain; Screening Model;
Conference_Titel :
Control Conference (CCC), 2014 33rd Chinese
Conference_Location :
Nanjing
DOI :
10.1109/ChiCC.2014.6896030
