Research on stability of cooperation in SDN

Author

He, Jing ; Zong, Chuan-Hong ; Zhu, Hai-Yang ; Xu, Fu-Yuan

Author_Institution

Coll. of Econ. & Trade, Shanghai Fisheries Univ., China

Volume

5

fYear

2005

fDate

18-21 Aug. 2005

Firstpage

2971

Abstract

The stability of supply and demand network with multi-functional and opening characteristics for enterprise (SDN) is essential to its vitality and development. Either one-short static game in traditional enterprises or finitely repeated games in supply chain is inefficient cooperation relationship with low stability. The underlying economic reason which explains the stability of SDN is that infinitely repeated game and triggering strategy can lead to Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. This paper demonstrates the stability of SDN in detail by establishing economic model of cooperation relationship among SDN member enterprises.

Keywords

Pareto optimisation; game theory; supply and demand; supply chains; Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium; economic model; repeated game strategy; supply chain; supply-demand network; triggering strategy; Aquaculture; Disaster management; Educational institutions; Game theory; Helium; Research and development management; Stability; Supply and demand; Supply chains; Technology management; Repeated game; SDN; Stability;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 2005. Proceedings of 2005 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Guangzhou, China

Print_ISBN

0-7803-9091-1

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICMLC.2005.1527451

Filename

1527451