An Improved Side-Channel Attack Based on Support Vector Machine

Author

Zhong Zeng ; Dawu Gu ; Junrong Liu ; Zheng Guo

Author_Institution

Dept. of Comput. Sci. & Eng., Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ., Shanghai, China

fYear

2014

fDate

15-16 Nov. 2014

Firstpage

676

Lastpage

680

Abstract

Side-channel attack (SCA) is a very efficient cryptanalysis technology to attack cryptographic devices. It takes advantage of physical information leakages to recover the cryptographic key. In order to strengthen the power to extract the cryptographic key-relevant information, this article introduces the Support Vector Machine technologies. Taking a software implementation of masked AES-256 on an Atmel ATMega-163 smart card, we applied an improved profiled side-channel attack to recover the cryptographic key. The current best result of our attack is able to recover the first 128 bits key using only one power trace.

Keywords

cryptography; support vector machines; Atmel ATMega-163 smart card; SCA; attack cryptographic devices; cryptanalysis technology; cryptographic key-relevant information; masked AES-256; side-channel attack; support vector machine technologies; Computational modeling; Computer science; Correlation; Cryptography; Hamming weight; Support vector machines; Training; AES-256; SCA; Support Vector Machine; information leakage; masking; profiled side-channel attack;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), 2014 Tenth International Conference on

Conference_Location

Kunming

Print_ISBN

978-1-4799-7433-7

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CIS.2014.80

Filename

7016982