Title :
File-sharing costs and quality-of-service
Author :
Tangpong, A. ; Kesidis, G.
Author_Institution :
CS&E & EE Depts, Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA, USA
Abstract :
The presence of high-volume file-sharing activity on the Internet has caused reconsideration of purely flat-rate pricing for bandwidth in some access networks through the use of dynamic differential service priorities for protocol-agnostic (application-neutral) congestion control. We study how BitTorrent-style file-sharing depends on flat-rate pricing. A simple deterministic game-model of BitTorrent incentives is formulated focusing on relative uplink bandwidth allocations for transactions (block swaps) between leecher peers. Our cost model for uplink allocation is a ramp function, where one leecher´s ramp has a larger interval of zero cost (the limited ¿flat-rate¿ region) than that of a leecher with a tendency to allocate less uplink bandwidth. For some simple cases, how the game converges to the boundary stationary (Nash equilibria) region is shown.
Keywords :
Internet; game theory; peer-to-peer computing; telecommunication congestion control; BitTorrent incentives; BitTorrent-style file-sharing; Internet; Nash equilibria; access networks; application-neutral congestion control; dynamic differential service; file-sharing costs; flat-rate pricing; high-volume file-sharing activity; protocol-agnostic congestion control; quality-of-service; simple deterministic game-model; uplink bandwidth allocation; Bandwidth; Channel allocation; Cost function; File servers; IP networks; Peer to peer computing; Pricing; Quality of service; Telecommunication traffic; Web and internet services;
Conference_Titel :
Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 2010 44th Annual Conference on
Conference_Location :
Princeton, NJ
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7416-5
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7417-2
DOI :
10.1109/CISS.2010.5464800
