File-sharing costs and quality-of-service

Author

Tangpong, A. ; Kesidis, G.

Author_Institution

CS&E & EE Depts, Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA, USA

fYear

2010

fDate

17-19 March 2010

Firstpage

1

Lastpage

6

Abstract

The presence of high-volume file-sharing activity on the Internet has caused reconsideration of purely flat-rate pricing for bandwidth in some access networks through the use of dynamic differential service priorities for protocol-agnostic (application-neutral) congestion control. We study how BitTorrent-style file-sharing depends on flat-rate pricing. A simple deterministic game-model of BitTorrent incentives is formulated focusing on relative uplink bandwidth allocations for transactions (block swaps) between leecher peers. Our cost model for uplink allocation is a ramp function, where one leecher´s ramp has a larger interval of zero cost (the limited Â¿flat-rateÂ¿ region) than that of a leecher with a tendency to allocate less uplink bandwidth. For some simple cases, how the game converges to the boundary stationary (Nash equilibria) region is shown.

Keywords

Internet; game theory; peer-to-peer computing; telecommunication congestion control; BitTorrent incentives; BitTorrent-style file-sharing; Internet; Nash equilibria; access networks; application-neutral congestion control; dynamic differential service; file-sharing costs; flat-rate pricing; high-volume file-sharing activity; protocol-agnostic congestion control; quality-of-service; simple deterministic game-model; uplink bandwidth allocation; Bandwidth; Channel allocation; Cost function; File servers; IP networks; Peer to peer computing; Pricing; Quality of service; Telecommunication traffic; Web and internet services;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 2010 44th Annual Conference on

Conference_Location

Princeton, NJ

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-7416-5

Electronic_ISBN

978-1-4244-7417-2

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/CISS.2010.5464800

Filename

5464800