• DocumentCode
    2367514
  • Title

    The pricing strategies in a new luxury goods manufacturer dominated supply chain

  • Author

    Yan, Jianyuan ; Sun, Yuechao ; Liu, Gan

  • Author_Institution
    Manage. Sci. & Eng. Dept., Nan Kai Univ., Tianjin, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    25-27 June 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    In the consumer market, new luxury brands (e.g. Emporio Armani, G-star, MiuMiu, Adidas Originals) usually act as the trendsetters and original designers, while some ordinary consumer goods´ brands (e.g. H&M, ZARA, Xstep, MetersBonwe) prefer to be followers. A new luxury goods manufacturer is also in a dominant place, when facing the supplier (as well as the outsourcer). Whereas, the situation is different for the Ordinary consumer goods manufacturer. This article studys the pricing strategies of three participants in a new luxury goods manufacturer dominated supply chain and some influence factors, basing on Cournot model and stackelberg model. After calculation and comparison, we analysed the corresponding strategies manufacturers and the supplier should adopt, when market size, brand value and product cost are changing, under given settings. And generally, we find that manufacturers benefit more in stackelberg game than in Cournot game, while the supplier gets more profit in Cournot game.
  • Keywords
    consumer products; game theory; pricing; strategic planning; supply chains; Cournot game model; brand value; luxury goods manufacturer; market size; ordinary consumer goods manufacturer; pricing strategies; stackelberg game model; supply chain; Educational institutions; Games; Materials; Mathematical model; Pricing; Supply chains; dominant retailer; new luxury goods; three part game; veblen effect; vertical Differentiation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2011 8th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Tianjin
  • ISSN
    2161-1890
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-61284-310-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICSSSM.2011.5959361
  • Filename
    5959361