DocumentCode :
2367514
Title :
The pricing strategies in a new luxury goods manufacturer dominated supply chain
Author :
Yan, Jianyuan ; Sun, Yuechao ; Liu, Gan
Author_Institution :
Manage. Sci. & Eng. Dept., Nan Kai Univ., Tianjin, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
25-27 June 2011
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
6
Abstract :
In the consumer market, new luxury brands (e.g. Emporio Armani, G-star, MiuMiu, Adidas Originals) usually act as the trendsetters and original designers, while some ordinary consumer goods´ brands (e.g. H&M, ZARA, Xstep, MetersBonwe) prefer to be followers. A new luxury goods manufacturer is also in a dominant place, when facing the supplier (as well as the outsourcer). Whereas, the situation is different for the Ordinary consumer goods manufacturer. This article studys the pricing strategies of three participants in a new luxury goods manufacturer dominated supply chain and some influence factors, basing on Cournot model and stackelberg model. After calculation and comparison, we analysed the corresponding strategies manufacturers and the supplier should adopt, when market size, brand value and product cost are changing, under given settings. And generally, we find that manufacturers benefit more in stackelberg game than in Cournot game, while the supplier gets more profit in Cournot game.
Keywords :
consumer products; game theory; pricing; strategic planning; supply chains; Cournot game model; brand value; luxury goods manufacturer; market size; ordinary consumer goods manufacturer; pricing strategies; stackelberg game model; supply chain; Educational institutions; Games; Materials; Mathematical model; Pricing; Supply chains; dominant retailer; new luxury goods; three part game; veblen effect; vertical Differentiation;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2011 8th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Tianjin
ISSN :
2161-1890
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-310-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICSSSM.2011.5959361
Filename :
5959361
Link To Document :
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