Title :
Rent-seeking contest with supervisor
Author :
Wu, Changlin ; Liu, Changchen ; Luo, Yunfeng
Author_Institution :
Instn. of Syst. Eng., Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
In this paper we show that when there is supervisor who decides whether to check the contest or not when contest is over, the competency is lower, in condition that the payoff the supervisor finds out the rent-seeking behavior is large enough, the efficiency of the anti-corruption institution is high enough, and the cost the supervisor checks the contest is low enough. Otherwise, although there is anti-corruption institution, it does not work well.
Keywords :
game theory; pricing; anticorruption institution; rent-seeking behavior; rent-seeking contest; supervisor; Biological system modeling; Educational institutions; Games; Modeling; Monopoly; Weapons;
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Technology (ICIST), 2012 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Hubei
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0343-0
DOI :
10.1109/ICIST.2012.6221628
