DocumentCode
2370854
Title
Rent-seeking contest with supervisor
Author
Wu, Changlin ; Liu, Changchen ; Luo, Yunfeng
Author_Institution
Instn. of Syst. Eng., Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Wuhan, China
fYear
2012
fDate
23-25 March 2012
Firstpage
161
Lastpage
163
Abstract
In this paper we show that when there is supervisor who decides whether to check the contest or not when contest is over, the competency is lower, in condition that the payoff the supervisor finds out the rent-seeking behavior is large enough, the efficiency of the anti-corruption institution is high enough, and the cost the supervisor checks the contest is low enough. Otherwise, although there is anti-corruption institution, it does not work well.
Keywords
game theory; pricing; anticorruption institution; rent-seeking behavior; rent-seeking contest; supervisor; Biological system modeling; Educational institutions; Games; Modeling; Monopoly; Weapons;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Science and Technology (ICIST), 2012 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Hubei
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0343-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICIST.2012.6221628
Filename
6221628
Link To Document