Abstract :
Patent pools have been shown to be helpful for competition and consumers in some situations by reducing patent thickets and resolving blocking positions. Pools also have the potential to limit royalty stacking, which is one of the most significant problems in the standardisation system. But this requires that major IPR owners join the pool and offer essential patents at a reasonable royalty level. However, a deeper look into the realities of patent pools in the telecommunication field has shown that only a few of the patent holders for a standard will join a pool leaving many patent holders outside the pool seeking bilateral licensing agreements. Therefore, with limited participation by the patent holders, the thicket is only reduced rather than cleared. Patent pools still have room for improvement in order to make the participation more attractive to the industry and ensure protection to consumers. Also, it is questionable whether pools could de facto fulfill the necessary requirements for their success in, e.g., the ICT sector: a cost effective and fast evaluation system based in the value of the contributed technology, an offer of pool patents in small packages, a defensive clause that involves other standards outside the pool, a lack of an aggressive use of the patents, and the inclusion of not only technically but also commercially essential patents.
