Evolutionary game of driver response to variable message signs´ information

Driver response to variable message signs´ recommendation is analyzed. Each driver has two strategies: accepting the recommendation or refusing the recommendation. A decision making model of strategy selection of drivers is proposed. The process by which the proportion of strategies changed in the population over time is studied using evolutionary game theory. The stable states and stable strategy are analyzed. The results show that the proportion of drivers accepting the recommendation will converge to 100% over time if and only if the driver´s payoff of accepting the recommendation is larger than the payoff of refusing recommendation. For VMS strategies, it is necessary that driver´s payoff of accepting the recommendation should be strictly larger than the payoff of refusing recommendation and the difference of the two payoffs should be as large as possible. Meanwhile, VMS should make a positive impression on them when drivers use the VMS recommendation at the first time. These provide decision support for VMS strategy making.