• DocumentCode
    2382880
  • Title

    Dynamics of Cournot Game of Electricity Market with Bounded Rationality Considering Transmission Constraints

  • Author

    Yang, Hongming ; Zhou, Renjun ; Lai, Mingyong

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Electr. & Information Eng., Changsha Univ. of Sci. & Technol.
  • fYear
    2006
  • fDate
    21-24 May 2006
  • Firstpage
    511
  • Lastpage
    516
  • Abstract
    In electricity market environment, it is important for market operators and market participants to analyze and master the dynamic behavior of market. In order to accurately model the game behaviors of market participants with bounded rationality, this paper proposes the dynamic Cournot game model with bounded rationality considering transmission constraints. With this model, the Nash equilibrium and its stability of duopoly game are qualitatively analyzed, indicating that in electricity market there are different Nash equilibriums in different market parameters and operational conditions of transmission network, i.e., congestion and non-congestion, and even in some cases there is not Nash equilibrium at all. Then, the effect of some market parameters is discussed on the stability of electricity market. Based on the duopoly game model, the market dynamic behaviors are numerically simulated, in which the periodic or chaotic behaviors are focused when the market parameters are out of the stability region of Nash equilibrium
  • Keywords
    game theory; power markets; transmission networks; Cournot game; Nash equilibrium; duopoly game stability; electricity market; transmission constraints; transmission network; Chaos; Differential equations; Educational institutions; Electricity supply industry; Nash equilibrium; Numerical simulation; Power generation; Power generation economics; Stability analysis; Supply and demand;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exhibition, 2005/2006 IEEE PES
  • Conference_Location
    Dallas, TX
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-9194-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/TDC.2006.1668549
  • Filename
    1668549