DocumentCode
2394527
Title
Requirements and architectures for Intrinsically Assurable Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Author
Alexander, Scott ; DeCleene, Brian ; Rogers, Jason ; Sholander, Peter
Author_Institution
Telcordia, Piscataway, NJ
fYear
2008
fDate
16-19 Nov. 2008
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
10
Abstract
An intrinsically assurable mobile ad hoc network (IAMANET) will directly support the integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality, and safety of MANET communications and data. In contrast, the dominant Internet paradigm is intrinsically insecure. For example, the Internet does not deny unauthorized traffic by default and therefore violates the principle of least privilege. In addition, there are no provisions for non-repudiation or accountability and therefore adversaries can probe for vulnerabilities with impunity because the likelihood of attributing bad behavior to a particular adversary is limited. Finally (although not exhaustively) existing protocols are not robust to Byzantine failures and malicious behavior, leaving entire Internet-based systems vulnerable. This paper expands on these high-level requirements and threat models. It then presents an early view of two high-level architectures for an IAMANET, PIANO and Zodiac.
Keywords
ad hoc networks; failure analysis; mobile radio; protocols; Byzantine failure; IAMANET; high-level architecture; intrinsically assurable mobile ad hoc network; protocol; Availability; Internet; Mobile ad hoc networks; Mobile communication; Probes; Protocols; Robustness; Safety; Telecommunication network reliability; Telecommunication traffic;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Military Communications Conference, 2008. MILCOM 2008. IEEE
Conference_Location
San Diego, CA
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-2676-8
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-2677-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753172
Filename
4753172
Link To Document