• DocumentCode
    2394527
  • Title

    Requirements and architectures for Intrinsically Assurable Mobile Ad hoc Networks

  • Author

    Alexander, Scott ; DeCleene, Brian ; Rogers, Jason ; Sholander, Peter

  • Author_Institution
    Telcordia, Piscataway, NJ
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    16-19 Nov. 2008
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    10
  • Abstract
    An intrinsically assurable mobile ad hoc network (IAMANET) will directly support the integrity, availability, reliability, confidentiality, and safety of MANET communications and data. In contrast, the dominant Internet paradigm is intrinsically insecure. For example, the Internet does not deny unauthorized traffic by default and therefore violates the principle of least privilege. In addition, there are no provisions for non-repudiation or accountability and therefore adversaries can probe for vulnerabilities with impunity because the likelihood of attributing bad behavior to a particular adversary is limited. Finally (although not exhaustively) existing protocols are not robust to Byzantine failures and malicious behavior, leaving entire Internet-based systems vulnerable. This paper expands on these high-level requirements and threat models. It then presents an early view of two high-level architectures for an IAMANET, PIANO and Zodiac.
  • Keywords
    ad hoc networks; failure analysis; mobile radio; protocols; Byzantine failure; IAMANET; high-level architecture; intrinsically assurable mobile ad hoc network; protocol; Availability; Internet; Mobile ad hoc networks; Mobile communication; Probes; Protocols; Robustness; Safety; Telecommunication network reliability; Telecommunication traffic;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Military Communications Conference, 2008. MILCOM 2008. IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    San Diego, CA
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2676-8
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2677-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/MILCOM.2008.4753172
  • Filename
    4753172