Title :
Study on Revenue Sharing and Coordination Mechanism of the Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Nash Negotiation Model and Buyback Contract
Author :
Guangjun, Xing ; Zifang, Lu
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Nanjing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Nanjing, China
Abstract :
The paper discusses revenue sharing and coordination mechanism of the reverse logistics including a manufacturer and a retailer who experiences stochastic demand. On the base of optimization models designed, the optimal order quantity and the optimal price at which the producer buybacks the retailer´s surplus commodities are acquired. As a result of the revenue sharing and coordination mechanism based on Nash negotiation model and buyback contract, profit of the close loop supply chains can be maximized and coordination of its members can be realized. Finally, a mathematics model is given to verify the conclusions.
Keywords :
contracts; game theory; optimisation; reverse logistics; supply chain management; Nash negotiation model; buyback contract; close loop supply chains; coordination mechanism; optimization models; revenue sharing; reverse logistics; Biological system modeling; Book reviews; Chromium; Contracts; Mathematical model; Reverse logistics; Supply chains; Nash negotiation model; buyback contract; coordination; reverse logistics;
Conference_Titel :
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3997-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICEE.2010.1157