• DocumentCode
    2395727
  • Title

    Study on Revenue Sharing and Coordination Mechanism of the Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Nash Negotiation Model and Buyback Contract

  • Author

    Guangjun, Xing ; Zifang, Lu

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Nanjing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Nanjing, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    7-9 May 2010
  • Firstpage
    4612
  • Lastpage
    4615
  • Abstract
    The paper discusses revenue sharing and coordination mechanism of the reverse logistics including a manufacturer and a retailer who experiences stochastic demand. On the base of optimization models designed, the optimal order quantity and the optimal price at which the producer buybacks the retailer´s surplus commodities are acquired. As a result of the revenue sharing and coordination mechanism based on Nash negotiation model and buyback contract, profit of the close loop supply chains can be maximized and coordination of its members can be realized. Finally, a mathematics model is given to verify the conclusions.
  • Keywords
    contracts; game theory; optimisation; reverse logistics; supply chain management; Nash negotiation model; buyback contract; close loop supply chains; coordination mechanism; optimization models; revenue sharing; reverse logistics; Biological system modeling; Book reviews; Chromium; Contracts; Mathematical model; Reverse logistics; Supply chains; Nash negotiation model; buyback contract; coordination; reverse logistics;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Guangzhou
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3997-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICEE.2010.1157
  • Filename
    5590598