• DocumentCode
    2406137
  • Title

    Lightweight Attacks against Channel Assignment Protocols in MIMC Wireless Networks

  • Author

    Gu, Qijun ; Yu, Meng ; Zang, Wanyu ; Liu, Peng

  • Author_Institution
    Texas State Univ., San Marcos, TX, USA
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    5-9 June 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    Although multi-interface multi-channel (MIMC) wireless networks have drawn much attention, they are susceptible to various attacks. This paper describes three new types of attacks against a variety of channel assignment protocols: utilization-based conflict attack, link break attack, and denial-of-data attack. These attacks exploit the vulnerabilities arising from the inherent properties of channel assignment protocols in MIMC wireless networks. Analysis and simulation show that the identified attacks are not only very lightweight in attacking but also devastating to the connectivity, throughput, and availability of the MIMC wireless networks.
  • Keywords
    channel allocation; protocols; radio networks; telecommunication network reliability; MIMC wireless network; channel assignment protocol; denial- of-data attack; lightweight attack; link break attack; multiinterface multichannel wireless network; utilization-based conflict attack; Maintenance engineering; Peer to peer computing; Protocols; Security; Switches; Throughput; US Department of Defense;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Communications (ICC), 2011 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Kyoto
  • ISSN
    1550-3607
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-61284-232-5
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1550-3607
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/icc.2011.5962522
  • Filename
    5962522