Title :
Incentives, information, and winner´s curse in construction industry bidding
Author :
Williams, Gerald H., Jr. ; Anderson, Timothy R.
Author_Institution :
Eng. Manage. Program, Portland State Univ., OR, USA
Abstract :
This paper investigates the relationship between incentives, information and winner´s curse in the bidding for construction industry contracts. The approach uses both simple Monte Carlo simulations and bidding experiments to show the effects of changing levels of information (in terms of variance) and incentive (in terms of risk share) on the winner´s curse
Keywords :
Monte Carlo methods; construction industry; contracts; risk management; Monte Carlo simulations; bidding experiments; changing information levels; construction industry bidding; construction industry contracts; incentives; information; risk share; winner´s curse; Civil engineering; Construction industry; Contracts; Costs; Operations research; Research and development management; Student experiments; Uncertainty; Vehicles;
Conference_Titel :
Innovation in Technology Management - The Key to Global Leadership. PICMET '97: Portland International Conference on Management and Technology
Conference_Location :
Portland, OR
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-3574-0
DOI :
10.1109/PICMET.1997.653421
