Author_Institution :
Sch. of Civiland Archit. Eng., Wuhan Univ., Wuhan, China
Abstract :
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
As the scale and amount of the government-invested projects increases, the phenomenon of auditing collusion is widespread, therefore the supervision of auditing collusion constitutes the tripartite game playing of supervisory authority, social intermediary and entity. In a process of single phase game playing, collusion cost is high, the probability of collusion is low, supervisory authority needs to improve the probability of successful supervision, reduce the phenomenon of collusion effectively. in the process of repeated game playing, intensify sanctions, ensure the normal income of the conspiring body, the probability equilibrium solution of supervisory will be lower, so as to improve the efficiency of the government investment.
Keywords :
auditing; game theory; government; investment; project management; auditing collusion; government-invested projects; probability equilibrium solution; social intermediary; successful supervision probability; supervisory authority; tripartite game analysis; Biological system modeling; Construction industry; Economics; Games; Government; Investments; collusion; equilibrium analysis; government-invested projects; measure; tripartite game playing;
