DocumentCode
2430440
Title
Notice of Retraction
Earnings Quality and the Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholder
Author
Lu Chuang ; Li Xiuhong ; Zhang Lei
Author_Institution
Sch. of Accountancy, Central Univ. of Finance & Econ., Beijing, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
5132
Lastpage
5135
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
High quality accounting information can help mitigate the information asymmetry of the Principal-Agent problem. So, it has a great effect on the corporate governance. Using instrumental variables and panel data model, this paper analyses how the earnings quality, measured by accrual quality, affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder empirically. It reveals that earnings quality affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder significantly; companies with higher earnings quality have lower agency costs of controlling shareholder, and the agency costs decreases with the improvement of earnings quality. The results provide new evidence on the corporate governance effect of accounting information.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
High quality accounting information can help mitigate the information asymmetry of the Principal-Agent problem. So, it has a great effect on the corporate governance. Using instrumental variables and panel data model, this paper analyses how the earnings quality, measured by accrual quality, affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder empirically. It reveals that earnings quality affects the agency costs of controlling shareholder significantly; companies with higher earnings quality have lower agency costs of controlling shareholder, and the agency costs decreases with the improvement of earnings quality. The results provide new evidence on the corporate governance effect of accounting information.
Keywords
accounting; economics; accrual quality; agency costs; controlling shareholder; corporate governance effect; earnings quality; high quality accounting information; information asymmetry; panel data model; principal agent problem; Companies; Economics; Finance; Industries; Instruments; Robustness; Tunneling; accrual quality; agency costs of controlling shareholder; earnings quality;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.1288
Filename
5592366
Link To Document