DocumentCode
2431066
Title
Commitment effect on social welfare in monopolist market
Author
Niu, WenJie ; Tao, Lei
Author_Institution
Mil. Economic Acad., Wuhan, China
fYear
2011
fDate
8-11 Jan. 2011
Firstpage
636
Lastpage
640
Abstract
This paper shows the effect of commitment from the monopolist on the social welfare. When monopolists can make commitment about his pattern of innovation, the innovation pace is slower than that where he can only react to consumers´ expectations, and the social welfare gets worse. Consider the frequency of introducing new products, contrary to Hoppe & Lee´s conclusions, the deterrence for entry could play a positive effect on social welfare.
Keywords
customer satisfaction; innovation management; monopoly; public administration; Lee conclusion; commitment effect; consumer expectation; innovation pace; innovation pattern; monopolist market; social welfare; Biological system modeling; Central Processing Unit; Floods; Investments; Monopoly; Technological innovation; R&D; commitment; durable goods monopoly; entry deterrence;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Industrial Engineering (MSIE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8383-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707489
Filename
5707489
Link To Document