DocumentCode
2431761
Title
Game on the quality of logistics outsourcing for fresh food supervision
Author
Beilin, Liu ; Wenjuan, Zhang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Univ. of Commerce, Harbin, China
fYear
2011
fDate
8-11 Jan. 2011
Firstpage
765
Lastpage
769
Abstract
The fresh food logistics outsourcing quality supervision is analyzed by using the game theory. Based on different hypothesis models of one-stage game and multi-stage games are established. And the equilibrium strategy for the two parties is produced. Some key factors impact on the two parties. Some factors like the supervision cost of the fresh food enterprises and the cheat amount for the third party company are discussed. Then the paper suggests that fresh food enterprises reduce the risks or the quality problems of the logistics outsourcing.
Keywords
food safety; game theory; logistics; outsourcing; quality management; risk management; cheat amount; equilibrium strategy; fresh food logistic outsourcing; game theory; multistage games; one-stage game; quality supervision; risk reduction; third party company; Companies; Games; Logistics; Monitoring; Outsourcing; Process control; agency; food; game; quality of logistics outsourcing;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management Science and Industrial Engineering (MSIE), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-8383-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/MSIE.2011.5707521
Filename
5707521
Link To Document