DocumentCode
243512
Title
Heterogeneity in Lowest Unique Integer Game
Author
Yamada, Tomoaki ; Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Intell. & Syst. Sci., Tokyo Inst. of Technol., Yokohama, Japan
fYear
2014
fDate
21-25 July 2014
Firstpage
462
Lastpage
467
Abstract
This study investigates a Lowest Unique Integer Game (LUIG) by agent-based simulation. LUIG is a game in which each player submit a positive integer, and the player who has submitted the unique least integer wins. We consider mixtures of two types of players, naive adaptive learner and more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner, and investigate how each type of player behaves and learns. Our results show that more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner often lose against naive adaptive learner. LUIG with small number of players seems belong to one of those situations in which it is better to be naive than to be sophisticated.
Keywords
economics; game theory; software agents; LUIG; agent-based simulation; computational economics; heterogeneity; lowest unique integer game; naive adaptive learner; positive integer; quasifictitious play learner; Computational modeling; Conferences; Economics; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Frequency measurement; Games; Heterogeneity; agent-based computational economics; learning;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2014 IEEE 38th International
Conference_Location
Vasteras
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/COMPSACW.2014.78
Filename
6903173
Link To Document