• DocumentCode
    243512
  • Title

    Heterogeneity in Lowest Unique Integer Game

  • Author

    Yamada, Tomoaki ; Hanaki, Nobuyuki

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Intell. & Syst. Sci., Tokyo Inst. of Technol., Yokohama, Japan
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    21-25 July 2014
  • Firstpage
    462
  • Lastpage
    467
  • Abstract
    This study investigates a Lowest Unique Integer Game (LUIG) by agent-based simulation. LUIG is a game in which each player submit a positive integer, and the player who has submitted the unique least integer wins. We consider mixtures of two types of players, naive adaptive learner and more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner, and investigate how each type of player behaves and learns. Our results show that more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner often lose against naive adaptive learner. LUIG with small number of players seems belong to one of those situations in which it is better to be naive than to be sophisticated.
  • Keywords
    economics; game theory; software agents; LUIG; agent-based simulation; computational economics; heterogeneity; lowest unique integer game; naive adaptive learner; positive integer; quasifictitious play learner; Computational modeling; Conferences; Economics; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Frequency measurement; Games; Heterogeneity; agent-based computational economics; learning;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2014 IEEE 38th International
  • Conference_Location
    Vasteras
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/COMPSACW.2014.78
  • Filename
    6903173