DocumentCode :
243512
Title :
Heterogeneity in Lowest Unique Integer Game
Author :
Yamada, Tomoaki ; Hanaki, Nobuyuki
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Intell. & Syst. Sci., Tokyo Inst. of Technol., Yokohama, Japan
fYear :
2014
fDate :
21-25 July 2014
Firstpage :
462
Lastpage :
467
Abstract :
This study investigates a Lowest Unique Integer Game (LUIG) by agent-based simulation. LUIG is a game in which each player submit a positive integer, and the player who has submitted the unique least integer wins. We consider mixtures of two types of players, naive adaptive learner and more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner, and investigate how each type of player behaves and learns. Our results show that more sophisticated quasi fictitious play learner often lose against naive adaptive learner. LUIG with small number of players seems belong to one of those situations in which it is better to be naive than to be sophisticated.
Keywords :
economics; game theory; software agents; LUIG; agent-based simulation; computational economics; heterogeneity; lowest unique integer game; naive adaptive learner; positive integer; quasifictitious play learner; Computational modeling; Conferences; Economics; Educational institutions; Electronic mail; Frequency measurement; Games; Heterogeneity; agent-based computational economics; learning;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2014 IEEE 38th International
Conference_Location :
Vasteras
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/COMPSACW.2014.78
Filename :
6903173
Link To Document :
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