Fairness-guaranteed pricing and power allocation with a friendly jammer against eavesdropping

In wireless communication, jamming is a promising solution to provide improvement in secrecy rate, especially when security requirement is difficult to satisfy in realistic environment. Users could pay the friendly jammer for some interference to the eavesdropper and consequently improve the secrecy rate of their own, while the jammer wants to get maximum revenue within its capability. Thereby a Stackelberg game is introduced. Fairness also deserves particular attention, as unfair allocation of the limited resource deteriorates the performance of whole network. In this paper, we discuss a network with one jammer and several users, where they participate in the game and reach equilibrium ultimately. We utilize Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to guarantee fairness among users, making them balance their utility so as to make the best of the interference from the jammer. Moreover, we propose implementation of algorithm and demonstrate the performance.