DocumentCode
2445183
Title
Notice of Retraction
The Design of Subsidy Contract for Reverse Supply Chain Coordination under Random Collection Quantity
Author
Wang Wenbin ; Da Qingli
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., China Univ. of Min. & Technol., Xuzhou, China
fYear
2010
fDate
7-9 May 2010
Firstpage
4775
Lastpage
4778
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the reverse supply chain coordination with random collection quantity. The expected collection quantity, the contraction quantity and the reverse supply chain profits are compared by modeling under four different decision cases. The results show that the buy-back contract can not coordinate the reverse supply chain while the overstock subsidy contract does; furthermore, the nature of subsidy contract is the share of risk by the manufacturer and the collector for the overstock quantities, which lead to the aim of the coordination. The profits of reverse supply chain decrease with the increase of the variance of collection quantity.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the reverse supply chain coordination with random collection quantity. The expected collection quantity, the contraction quantity and the reverse supply chain profits are compared by modeling under four different decision cases. The results show that the buy-back contract can not coordinate the reverse supply chain while the overstock subsidy contract does; furthermore, the nature of subsidy contract is the share of risk by the manufacturer and the collector for the overstock quantities, which lead to the aim of the coordination. The profits of reverse supply chain decrease with the increase of the variance of collection quantity.
Keywords
contracts; reverse logistics; supply chain management; supply chains; buy-back contract; collection quantity; contraction quantity; overstock quantity; reverse supply chain coordination; subsidy contract; Book reviews; Contracts; Educational institutions; Europe; Manufacturing; Stochastic processes; Supply chains; collection; coordination; reverse supply chain; subsidy contract; supply chain management;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3997-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICEE.2010.1200
Filename
5593174
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