• DocumentCode
    2447205
  • Title

    Paranoid Proof-Number Search

  • Author

    Saito, Jahn-Takeshi ; Winands, Mark H M

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Knowledge Eng., Maastricht Univ., Maastricht, Netherlands
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    18-21 Aug. 2010
  • Firstpage
    203
  • Lastpage
    210
  • Abstract
    Over the years, an increasing number of two-player games has been added to the list of solved games. However, solving multi-player games has so far received little, if any, attention. One of the reasons is that while two-player games have a unique game-theoretical value, no unique game-theoretical value may exist in multi-player games as they can have many equilibrium points. We propose solving multi-player games under the paranoid condition. This is equivalent to find the optimal score that a player can achieve independent of the other players´ strategies. We furthermore introduce and examine an algorithm, called Paranoid Proof-Number Search (PPNS), for solving multi-player games under the paranoid condition. PPNS is tested by solving the 4×4 and 6×6 variant of the multi-player game Rolit, a multi-player generalization of Reversi (Othello). Our results show that no player can win more than the analytical minimum score in 6 × 6 Rolit while on 4 × 4 Rolit the players are able to score higher. Moreover, the experiments show that for Rolit PPNS is taking advantage of the non-uniformity of the game tree.
  • Keywords
    computer games; generalisation (artificial intelligence); tree searching; Reversi; Rolit; equilibrium points; game tree; multiplayer games; multiplayer generalization; optimal score; paranoid proof-number search; two-player games; unique game-theoretical value; Algorithm design and analysis; Color; Computational intelligence; Computational modeling; Conferences; Games; Law;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG), 2010 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Dublin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6295-7
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6296-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ITW.2010.5593354
  • Filename
    5593354