Title :
A Method for Preventing "Skipping" Attacks
Author_Institution :
Security & Content Protection Labs., Cesson-Sévigné, France
Abstract :
Until recently, known fault attacks against (non-CRT) exponentiation-based cryptosystems were supposed to be of rather theoretical nature, as they require a precise fault injection, e.g., a bit flip. However, Schmidt and Herbst (FDTC 2008) reported practical fault-attacks against RSA in standard mode using low-cost equipment. Although their attacks were described against RSA, they readily extend to any other exponentiation-based cryptosystem. This paper describes an efficient method to prevent those new attacks.
Keywords :
cryptography; RSA; exponentiation-based cryptosystems; low-cost equipment; practical fault-attacks; skipping attacks; Algorithm design and analysis; Conferences; Digital signatures; Elliptic curve cryptography; Standards; RSA cryptosystem; countermeasures; exponentiation-based cryptosystems; fault attacks; skipping attacks;
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2012 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
San Francisco, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-2157-0
DOI :
10.1109/SPW.2012.14
