DocumentCode
2461438
Title
The Effects and Evolution of Implicit Trust in Populations Playing the Iterated Prisoner´s Dilemma
Author
Howley, E. ; O´Riordan, C.
Author_Institution
Nat. Univ. of Ireland, Galway
fYear
2006
fDate
16-21 July 2006
Firstpage
793
Lastpage
799
Abstract
The concept of trust is central to engendering cooperation among autonomous agents. This paper focuses on the topic of trust and how agents may bias their interactions based upon implicit trust. We define implicit trust as that which is conveyed through the utilities of a simple game offer. We introduce this concept of implicit trust and present our motivations for examining this phenomenon. We define a game theoretic framework, including possible strategy sets and a game environment. We outline a series of experiments which illustrate the effects of implicit trust. Finally, we draw conclusions based on the experimental results presented.
Keywords
evolutionary computation; game theory; iterative methods; multi-agent systems; set theory; autonomous agents; game theoretic framework; implicit trust evolution; iterated prisoner dilemma; strategy set; Autonomous agents; Equations; Game theory; Information technology; Tagging;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Evolutionary Computation, 2006. CEC 2006. IEEE Congress on
Conference_Location
Vancouver, BC
Print_ISBN
0-7803-9487-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CEC.2006.1688392
Filename
1688392
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