Notice of RetractionEfficient Analysis of Informative Advertising Strategy in E-Commerce Platforms

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Informative advertising as one of widespread strategies in e-commerce platforms is used for attracting more agents of different sides on board. In this paper, we build a two-stage model to analyze the efficient of informative advertising on equilibrium prices and profit based on two-sided markets theory. In the case of completely covered agent s´ markets, we conclude e-commerce platforms with higher advertising input can not set higher equilibrium entrance prices and get more profits, but they will get bigger market shares. Ironically, the bigger advertising input always profits its rival. Further more, we find that only moderate advertising will improve social welfare, too much or too litter advertising input will decrease social welfare.