• DocumentCode
    2485410
  • Title

    Electromagnetic information leakage for side-channel analysis of cryptographic modules

  • Author

    Homma, Naofumi ; Aoki, Takafumi ; Satoh, Akashi

  • Author_Institution
    Grad. Sch. of Inf. Sci., Tohoku Univ., Sendai, Japan
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    25-30 July 2010
  • Firstpage
    97
  • Lastpage
    102
  • Abstract
    A new class of physical attacks against cryptographic modules, which is called the side-channel attack, is now drawing much attention. Side-channel attacks exploit information leakage from a physical implementation, such as power consumption and electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. This paper presents an overview of the recent trends in side-channel attacks, including EM analysis attacks, and related activities in the security evaluation of cryptographic modules.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; electromagnetic waves; cryptographic modules; electromagnetic information leakage; electromagnetic radiation; power consumption; side-channel attack analysis; Algorithm design and analysis; Correlation; Encryption; Field programmable gate arrays; Oscilloscopes; Power demand;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), 2010 IEEE International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Fort Lauderdale, FL
  • ISSN
    2158-110X
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6305-3
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISEMC.2010.5711254
  • Filename
    5711254