• DocumentCode
    2495181
  • Title

    Flow Control in Communication Networks with Competing Teams of Cooperative Users

  • Author

    Sahin, Ismet ; Simaan, Marwan A.

  • Author_Institution
    Compunetix Inc., Pittsburgh
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    26-30 Nov. 2007
  • Firstpage
    497
  • Lastpage
    501
  • Abstract
    In this paper, we investigate flow control schemes for general communication networks with competing teams of cooperative users. Previously, for general network topologies flow control mechanisms for networks with all competitive users and with all cooperative users have been studied. In this paper, we use a hierarchical flow control scheme which is capable to represent a more realistic network condition in which there are multiple competitive teams, each team having cooperative users. That is, each team competes with the others to provide the best possible performance for its members (users) and members of each team cooperate to increase their team´s performance. All- competitive and all-cooperative cases are simply two special cases of this hierarchical model. That is, the network involves all cooperative users when there is only one team in the network and the network involves all competitive users when there are multiple teams but each having only one user. In this model, each user tries to maximize a power criterion utility function and each team tries to maximize a team´s utility function which is a weighted sum of utilities of the users in this team. We use Pareto and Non-Inferior Nash strategies as solution concepts for one team and multiple team flow control problems respectively. We compare the results of these strategies to those corresponding to the standard Nash strategy and using an illustrative example we observe that users can possibly obtain larger utilities when they are in a team than when they operate competitively on their own.
  • Keywords
    Pareto analysis; game theory; telecommunication congestion control; Pareto strategy; communication networks; competitive users; cooperative users; flow control schemes; game theory; hierarchical model; multiple competitive teams; noninferior Nash strategy; power criterion utility function; team utility function; Communication networks; Communication system control; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Network topology; Optimal control; Pricing; Routing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Global Telecommunications Conference, 2007. GLOBECOM '07. IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Washington, DC
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1042-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-1043-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GLOCOM.2007.99
  • Filename
    4411009