Mitigating Sandwich Attacks Against a Secure Key Management Scheme in Wireless Sensor Networks for PCS/SCADA

Alzaid et al. proposed a forward & backward secure key management scheme in wireless sensor networks for Process Control Systems (PCSs) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The scheme, however, is still vulnerable to an attack called the sandwich attack that can be launched when the adversary captures two sensor nodes at times t₁ and t₂, and then reveals all the group keys used between times t₁ and t₂. In this paper, a fix to the scheme is proposed in order to limit the vulnerable time duration to an arbitrarily chosen time span while keeping the forward and backward secrecy of the scheme untouched. Then, the performance analysis for our proposal, Alzaid et al.´s scheme, and Nilsson et al.´s scheme is given.