Title :
Conditional games: A framework for coordination
Author_Institution :
Fac. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT, USA
Abstract :
Game theory is often proposed as a framework within which to model coordination. Neoclassical game theory, however, focuses exclusively on individual preferences, whereas coordination requires a concept of group preference as well as individual preferences. Conditional game theory differs from classical theory in two fundamental ways. First, it involves a utility structure that permits agents to define their preferences conditioned on the preferences of other agents, and second, it accommodates a notion of group rationality as well as individual rationality. The resulting framework permits a notion of group preferences to be defined, and leads to the development of a metric to characterize the intrinsic ability of the members of a group to coordinate.
Keywords :
game theory; group theory; multi-agent systems; conditional game theory; group rationality; model coordination; multiagent system; neoclassical game theory; Coherence; Entropy; Game theory; Games; Joints; Measurement; Multiagent systems; GameTheory; Multiagent Systems; Utility Theory;
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2011 Chinese
Conference_Location :
Mianyang
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8737-0
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2011.5968141