• DocumentCode
    2509986
  • Title

    Conditional games: A framework for coordination

  • Author

    Stirling, Wynn

  • Author_Institution
    Fac. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT, USA
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    23-25 May 2011
  • Firstpage
    35
  • Lastpage
    40
  • Abstract
    Game theory is often proposed as a framework within which to model coordination. Neoclassical game theory, however, focuses exclusively on individual preferences, whereas coordination requires a concept of group preference as well as individual preferences. Conditional game theory differs from classical theory in two fundamental ways. First, it involves a utility structure that permits agents to define their preferences conditioned on the preferences of other agents, and second, it accommodates a notion of group rationality as well as individual rationality. The resulting framework permits a notion of group preferences to be defined, and leads to the development of a metric to characterize the intrinsic ability of the members of a group to coordinate.
  • Keywords
    game theory; group theory; multi-agent systems; conditional game theory; group rationality; model coordination; multiagent system; neoclassical game theory; Coherence; Entropy; Game theory; Games; Joints; Measurement; Multiagent systems; GameTheory; Multiagent Systems; Utility Theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2011 Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Mianyang
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8737-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2011.5968141
  • Filename
    5968141