DocumentCode :
2510030
Title :
Game analysis of financial supervision in international financial crisis
Author :
Luo, Xin ; Zhang, Pei-ai
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Math., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
23-25 May 2011
Firstpage :
46
Lastpage :
50
Abstract :
An universal and comprehensive complete information static game model between market participants and supervisors and analyze the factors that stimulate irregularities and the inhibitory effect of irregularities based on the idea of game theory. According to the game analysis, we propose some effective standards and recommendations for both participants and supervisors to resolve financial risks, including save supervision cost, improve the efficiency of financial supervision, establish incentive and restraint mechanisms for both participants and supervisors in order to make full use of the learning mechanisms and demonstration effect.
Keywords :
financial management; game theory; incentive schemes; risk management; demonstration effect; financial risk; financial supervision; game theory; incentive mechanism; international financial crisis; learning mechanism; restraint mechanism; Analytical models; Economics; Games; Inspection; Nash equilibrium; Security; financial supervision; game theory; mixed strategy; nash equilibrium;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2011 Chinese
Conference_Location :
Mianyang
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-8737-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2011.5968143
Filename :
5968143
Link To Document :
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