Title :
Optimal policies in name-your-own-price auction mechanism with multi-attribute decision
Author :
Rong Zhang ; Bin Liu ; Shuai Liu ; Xindi Ma
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Manage. Sci., Henan Agric. Univ., Zhengzhou, China
Abstract :
Name-your-own-price (NYOP) is a successful business model for high timeliness commodity. Consumers care not only price of commodity, but also the utility of commodity which much more attributes of commodity offer to consumers in addition to price. The researches on NYOP have studied the optimal game strategies about the buyer and sellers based on the price. Different from the existing literature, a new online multi-attribute reverse auction business model is designed, based on multiple attributes of commodity. The model extends NYOP to the pattern of name-your-own-desire (NYOD). And the optimal policies of buyer and sellers in NYOD are studies. Finally, a case demonstrates feasibility and high efficiency of our model.
Keywords :
commerce; game theory; pricing; NYOD business model; NYOP business model; buyer policy; commodity attribute; commodity price; commodity utility; multiattribute decision; name-your-own-desire; name-your-own-price auction mechanism; online multiattribute reverse auction business model; optimal game strategy; seller policy; timeliness commodity; Equations; Games; Internet; Pricing; Rail transportation; Standards; High timeliness commodity; Multi-attribute auction; Name-your-own-price; Optimal policies;
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence and Cybernetics (CyberneticsCom), 2012 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Bali
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-0891-5
DOI :
10.1109/CyberneticsCom.2012.6381624