• DocumentCode
    253295
  • Title

    Extreme Nash equilibrium of polymatrix games in electricity market

  • Author

    Sharma, Kailash Chand ; Bhakar, Rohit ; Tiwari, Honey Durga

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. Eng., Malaviya Nat. Inst. of Technol., Jaipur, India
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    9-11 May 2014
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    5
  • Abstract
    Game theoretical approaches are widely used for the analysis of oligopolistic electricity markets. Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of game theoretical approaches. Due to existence of mixed strategy equilibrium and large number of multiple players, finding Nash equilibrium for problems in electricity market is a difficult task. To resolve these difficulties, this paper proposes a simplified approach for finding extreme Nash equilibrium, based on payoff matrix approach and mixed integer linear programming (MILP). To illustrate the proposed approach, a practical case study of Cournot poly-matrix game is considered. Eliminating constraints are appended on the proposed approach to find a global optimal solution. Obtained results show the strength of proposed approach, in terms of simplicity and computational time.
  • Keywords
    game theory; integer programming; linear programming; matrix algebra; power markets; Cournot polymatrix game; MILP; Nash equilibrium; game theoretical approaches; global optimal solution; mixed integer linear programming; mixed strategy equilibrium; oligopolistic electricity markets; payoff matrix approach; Convergence; Generators; Indexes; MATLAB; Programming; Propagation losses; Electricity market; Nash equilibrium; mixed-integer linear programming; payoff matrix approach; poly-matrix game;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Recent Advances and Innovations in Engineering (ICRAIE), 2014
  • Conference_Location
    Jaipur
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-4041-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICRAIE.2014.6909279
  • Filename
    6909279