• DocumentCode
    2552516
  • Title

    Design of incentive mechanism and game analysis for project managers

  • Author

    Xu, Yan-Li ; Zhao, Chen-Guang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage., Harbin Normal Univ., Harbin, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    21-23 Oct. 2009
  • Firstpage
    429
  • Lastpage
    433
  • Abstract
    Through mathematical models and game theory, this paper analyzes the optimal incentive contracts between enterprises and their project managers under asymmetric information condition in order to solve the problems in establishing incentive mechanism for project managers. Punishment mechanism is introduced and analyzed in the design of incentive mechanism for project managers. It expands the theoretical frame for incentive mechanism. The results are as follows: Punishment mechanism is related and complementary with incentive mechanism. Both can encourage or guide the project managers to work hard towards common goals. Therefore, the function of the incentive mechanism and the punishment mechanism should be considered simultaneously in the design of incentive contracts for project managers. It helps to prevent project managers from speculating. Introduction of punishment mechanism into incentive mechanism not only results in theoretical innovation, but also has great application value in practice.
  • Keywords
    contracts; game theory; incentive schemes; project management; game analysis; game theory; mathematical models; optimal incentive contracts; project managers; punishment mechanism; theoretical innovation; Contracts; Game theory; Information analysis; Information management; Mathematical model; Probability density function; Production; Project management; Remuneration; Technological innovation; Asymmetric information; game theory; incentive mechanism; mathematical model; punishment mechanism;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IE&EM '09. 16th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3671-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-3672-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344558
  • Filename
    5344558