DocumentCode
2552516
Title
Design of incentive mechanism and game analysis for project managers
Author
Xu, Yan-Li ; Zhao, Chen-Guang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Harbin Normal Univ., Harbin, China
fYear
2009
fDate
21-23 Oct. 2009
Firstpage
429
Lastpage
433
Abstract
Through mathematical models and game theory, this paper analyzes the optimal incentive contracts between enterprises and their project managers under asymmetric information condition in order to solve the problems in establishing incentive mechanism for project managers. Punishment mechanism is introduced and analyzed in the design of incentive mechanism for project managers. It expands the theoretical frame for incentive mechanism. The results are as follows: Punishment mechanism is related and complementary with incentive mechanism. Both can encourage or guide the project managers to work hard towards common goals. Therefore, the function of the incentive mechanism and the punishment mechanism should be considered simultaneously in the design of incentive contracts for project managers. It helps to prevent project managers from speculating. Introduction of punishment mechanism into incentive mechanism not only results in theoretical innovation, but also has great application value in practice.
Keywords
contracts; game theory; incentive schemes; project management; game analysis; game theory; mathematical models; optimal incentive contracts; project managers; punishment mechanism; theoretical innovation; Contracts; Game theory; Information analysis; Information management; Mathematical model; Probability density function; Production; Project management; Remuneration; Technological innovation; Asymmetric information; game theory; incentive mechanism; mathematical model; punishment mechanism;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2009. IE&EM '09. 16th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Beijing
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-3671-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-3672-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICIEEM.2009.5344558
Filename
5344558
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