• DocumentCode
    2554393
  • Title

    Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

  • Author

    Cremers, Cas ; Rasmussen, Kasper B. ; Schmidt, Benedikt ; Capkun, S.

  • Author_Institution
    Inf. Security Group, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    20-23 May 2012
  • Firstpage
    113
  • Lastpage
    127
  • Abstract
    After several years of theoretical research on distance bounding protocols, the first implementations of such protocols have recently started to appear. These protocols are typically analyzed with respect to three types of attacks, which are historically known as Distance Fraud, Mafia Fraud, and Terrorist Fraud. We define and analyze a fourth main type of attack on distance bounding protocols, called Distance Hijacking. This type of attack poses a serious threat in many practical scenarios. We show that many proposed distance bounding protocols are vulnerable to Distance Hijacking, and we propose solutions to make these protocols resilient to this type of attack. We show that verifying distance bounding protocols using existing informal and formal frameworks does not guarantee the absence of Distance Hijacking attacks. We extend a formal framework for reasoning about distance bounding protocols to include overshadowing attacks. We use the resulting framework to prove the absence of all of the found attacks for protocols to which our countermeasures have been applied.
  • Keywords
    protocols; security of data; attack resiliency; distance bounding protocol; distance fraud; distance hijacking attack; formal framework; mafia fraud; overshadowing attack; terrorist fraud; Buildings; Cryptography; Protocols; Resilience; Terrorism; Upper bound; Distance bounding; attacks; formal model; formal verification; hijacking; location verification; multi-prover environment; position verification;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    San Francisco, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-1244-8
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1081-6011
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SP.2012.17
  • Filename
    6234408