• DocumentCode
    2564150
  • Title

    Detecting Misused Keys in Wireless Sensor Networks

  • Author

    Liu, Donggang ; Dong, Qi

  • Author_Institution
    Texas Univ., Arlington, TX
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    11-13 April 2007
  • Firstpage
    272
  • Lastpage
    280
  • Abstract
    Key management is the cornerstone for secure communication in sensor networks. Researchers have recently developed many techniques to setup pairwise keys between sensor nodes. However, these techniques allow an attacker to compromise a few sensor nodes and learn many pairwise keys used between non-compromised nodes. The attacker can then use these keys to impersonate non-compromised nodes and mislead the sensing application. To deal with this problem, this paper proposes to detect misused keys in sensor networks. The paper introduces a hidden layer of protection, which is designed for the security of pairwise keys rather than the messages in the network. It cannot be seen and will not be used by sensor nodes during normal communication. However, it can be checked by some special nodes to identify suspicious keys. With this idea, this paper develops a serial of techniques to detect misused keys. These techniques make it particularly difficult for an attacker to actively mislead the application using the compromised keys shared between non-compromised nodes. The paper also shows the effectiveness and efficiency of these techniques through analysis and experiments.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; telecommunication security; wireless sensor networks; detecting misused keys; key management; pairwise keys; secure communication; wireless sensor networks; Authentication; Base stations; Cryptography; Data acquisition; Monitoring; Peer to peer computing; Protection; Protocols; Security; Wireless sensor networks;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Performance, Computing, and Communications Conference, 2007. IPCCC 2007. IEEE Internationa
  • Conference_Location
    New Orleans, LA
  • ISSN
    1097-2641
  • Print_ISBN
    1-4244-1138-6
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1097-2641
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/PCCC.2007.358904
  • Filename
    4197940