DocumentCode :
2565153
Title :
Ghost key patterns with Equidistant Chosen Message attack on RSA-CRT
Author :
Park, Jong Yeon ; Han, Dong-Guk ; Yi, Okyeon ; Choi, Dooho
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Math., Kookmin Univ., Seoul, South Korea
fYear :
2011
fDate :
18-21 Oct. 2011
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
RSA is one of the most widely used public key algorithms, and the RSA-CRT variation is applied to improve efficiency of operations. Since Power analysis attacks were introduced, many researchers have studied not only power analysis attacks of RSA but also CRT specified attacks. Boer et al. [3] proposed a new analysis method for finding r = x mod p with equidistant chosen plaintexts. From the knowledge of r, we can compute a secret prime number p. As this method is based on equidistant messages, unlike general power analysis methods, it is called MRED (Modular reduction on equidistant data) power analysis or ECMPA (Equidistant Chosen Message Power Analysis). Since there are various novel characteristics in equidistant messages, there exist unusual properties of ghost keys that are not seen in general power attacks. In this paper, we describe unknown and interesting characteristics of ghost key patterns using real experiments.
Keywords :
public key cryptography; CRT specified attacks; RSA-CRT; equidistant chosen message attack; equidistant chosen message power analysis; equidistant data; general power analysis method; ghost key patterns; modular reduction; power analysis attacks; public key algorithm; secret prime number; Algorithm design and analysis; Correlation; Embedded systems; Hamming weight; Hardware; Public key cryptography; Correlation Power Analysis(CPA); Differential Power Analysis(DPA); MRED; RSA-CRT; Side channel attack;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Security Technology (ICCST), 2011 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on
Conference_Location :
Barcelona
ISSN :
1071-6572
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0902-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CCST.2011.6095924
Filename :
6095924
Link To Document :
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